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Abstract
Deep neural networks for natural language pro-
cessing tasks are vulnerable to adversarial input
perturbations. In this paper, we present a versatile
language for programmatically specifying string
transformations—e.g., insertions, deletions, sub-
stitutions, swaps, etc.—that are relevant to the
task at hand. We then present an approach to ad-
versarially training models that are robust to such
user-defined string transformations. Our approach
combines the advantages of search-based tech-
niques for adversarial training with abstraction-
based techniques. Specifically, we show how to
decompose a set of user-defined string transforma-
tions into two component specifications, one that
benefits from search and another from abstraction.
We use our technique to train models on the AG
and SST2 datasets and show that the resulting
models are robust to combinations of user-defined
transformations mimicking spelling mistakes and
other meaning-preserving transformations.
1. Introduction
Deep neural networks have proven incredibly powerful in a
huge range of machine-learning tasks. However, deep neural
networks are highly sensitive to small input perturbations
that cause the network’s accuracy to plummet (Carlini &
Wagner, 2017; Szegedy et al., 2013). In the context of
natural language processing, these adversarial examples
come in the form of spelling mistakes, use of synonyms,
etc.—essentially, meaning-preserving transformations that
cause the network to change its prediction (Ebrahimi et al.,
2018; Zhang et al., 2019a; Michel et al., 2019).
In this paper, we are interested in the problem of training
models over natural language—or, generally, sequences over
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a finite alphabet—that are robust to adversarial examples.
Sequences over finite alphabets are unique in that the space
of adversarial examples is discrete and therefore hard to ex-
plore efficiently using gradient-based optimization as in the
computer-vision setting. The common approach to achiev-
ing robustness is adversarial training (Goodfellow et al.,
2015; Madry et al., 2018), which has seen a great deal of re-
search in computer vision and, more recently, in natural lan-
guage processing (Ebrahimi et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2019a;
Michel et al., 2019). Suppose we have defined a space of
perturbations R(x) of a sample x—e.g., if x is a sentence,
R(x) contains every possible misspelling of words in x, up
to some bound on the number of misspellings. The idea
of adversarial training is to model an adversary within the
training objective function: Instead of computing the loss
for a sample (x, y) from the dataset, we compute the loss
for the worst-case perturbed sample z ∈ R(x). Formally,
the adversarial loss for (x, y) is maxz∈R(x) L(z, y, θ).
The question we ask in this paper is:
Can we train models that are robust against rich
perturbation spaces over strings?
The practical challenge in answering this question is com-
puting the worst-case loss. This is because the perturbation
space R(x) can be enormous and therefore impractical to
enumerate. This is particularly true for NLP tasks, where the
perturbation space R(x) should contain inputs that are se-
mantically equivalent to x—e.g., variations of the sentence
x with typos or words replaced by synonyms. Therefore,
we need to approximate the adversarial loss. There are two
such classes of approximation techniques:
Augmentation The first class of techniques computes a
lower bound on the adversarial loss by exploring a
finite number of points in R(x). This is usually
done by applying a gradient-based attack, like Hot-
Flip (Ebrahimi et al., 2018) for natural-language tasks
or PGD (Madry et al., 2018) for computer-vision tasks.
We call this class of techniques augmentation-based,
as they essentially search for a perturbed sample with
which to augment the training set.
Abstraction The second class of techniques computes an
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Figure 1. Illustration of augmentation, abstraction, and A3T
upper bound on the adversarial loss by overapproximat-
ing, or abstracting, the perturbation space R(x) into a
set of symbolic constraints that can be efficiently prop-
agated through the network. For example, the interval
abstraction has been used in numerous works (Mirman
et al., 2018; Gowal et al., 2019; Huang et al., 2019).
We call this class of techniques abstraction-based.
Both classes of techniques can produce suboptimal results:
augmentation can severely underapproximate the worst-
case loss and abstraction can severely overapproximate the
loss. Particularly, we observe that the two techniques have
complementary utility, working well on some perturbation
spaces but not others—for example, Huang et al. (2019)
have shown that abstraction works better for token sub-
stitutions, while augmentation-based techniques like Hot-
Flip (Ebrahimi et al., 2018) and MHA (Zhang et al., 2019a)
are general—e.g., apply to token deletions and insertions.
1.1. Our Approach
A hybrid approach We propose augmented abstract ad-
versarial training (A3T), an adversarial training technique
that combines the strengths of augmentation and abstraction
techniques. The key idea underlying A3T is to decompose
the perturbation space into two subsets, one that can be ex-
plored using augmentation and one that can be abstracted—
e.g., using augmentation to explore word duplication typos
and abstraction to explore replacing words with synonyms.
From an algorithmic perspective, our computation of adver-
sarial loss switches from a concrete, e.g., gradient-based,
search through the perturbation space to a symbolic search.
As such, for every training sample (x, y), our technique
may end up with a lower bound or an upper bound on its
adversarial loss (see Fig. 1).
A language for specifying string transformations The
challenge of applying A3T is how to exactly decompose
the perturbation space. Our key enabling idea is to de-
fine the perturbation space programmatically, in a way
that can be easily and cleanly decomposed. Specifically,
we define a general language in which we can specify
a perturbation space by a specification S in the form of
{(T1, δ1), . . . , (Tn, δn)}, containing a set of string trans-
formations Ti : X → 2X . The specification S defines a
perturbation space of all possible strings by applying each
transformation Ti up to δi times. For example, given a string
x, S(x) could define the set of all strings x′ that are like x
but with some words replaced by one of its synonyms and
with some stop words removed.
Given a perturbation space defined by a set of transforma-
tions, A3T decomposes the set of transformations into two
disjoint subsets, one that is explored concretely (augmenta-
tion) and one that is explored symbolically (abstraction).
Results We have implemented A3T and used it to train NLP
models for sentiment analysis that are robust to a range
of string transformations—e.g., character swaps modeling
spelling mistakes, substituting of a word with a synonym,
removing stop words, duplicating words, etc. Our results
show that A3T can train models that are more robust to
adversarial string transformations than those produced using
existing techniques.
1.2. Summary of Contributions
• We present A3T, a technique for training models that
are robust to string transformations. A3T combines
search-based attacks and abstraction-based techniques
to explore the perturbation space and compute good
approximations of adversarial loss.
• To enable A3T, we define a general language of string
transformations with which we can specify the pertur-
bation space. A3T exploits the specification to decom-
pose and search the perturbation space.
• We implement A3T1 and evaluate it on two datasets
and a variety of string transformations. Our results
demonstrate the increase in robustness achieved by
A3T in comparison with state-of-the-art techniques.
2. Related Work
Adversarial text generation Zhang et al. (2019b) pre-
sented a comprehensive overview of adversarial attacks on
neural networks over natural language. In this paper, we
focus on the word- and character-level. HotFlip (Ebrahimi
et al., 2018) is a gradient-based approach that can generate
the adversarial text in the perturbation space described by
word- and character-level transformations. MHA (Zhang
et al., 2019a) uses Metropolis-Hastings sampling guided by
1We will provide our code in the supplementary materi-
als. One can also access the open source project using the
anonymous link: https://anonymous.4open.science/
r/090c73a5-0825-4668-ae8d-96f8421ad0ec/.
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gradients to generate word-level adversarial text via word
substitution. Karpukhin et al. (2019) designed character-
level noise for training robust machine translation models.
Other work focuses on generating adversarial text on the
sentence-level (Liang et al., 2018) or paraphrase-level (Iyyer
et al., 2018; Ribeiro et al., 2018). Also, some works (Zhao
et al., 2018; Wang et al., 2019) try to generate natural or
grammatically correct adversarial text.
Abstract training Mirman et al. (2018) and Gowal et al.
(2019) first proposed DiffAI and interval bound propagation
(IBP) to train image classification models that are provably
robust to norm-bounded adversarial perturbations. They
performed abstract training by optimizing the abstract loss
obtained by Interval or Zonotope propagation. Mirman
et al. (2019) used DiffAI to provably defend deep residual
networks. Jia et al. (2019) used interval domain to capture
the perturbation space of substitution and train robust mod-
els for CNN and LSTM. Huang et al. (2019) proposed a
simplex space to capture the perturbation space of substi-
tution. They converted the simplex into intervals after the
first layer of the neural network and obtained the abstract
loss by IBP. We adopt their abstract training approach for
some of our transformations. We will show the limitation
of abstract training for more complex perturbations like the
combination of swap and substitution.
Other robustness techniques Other techniques to ensure
robustness involve placing a spelling-mistake-detection
model that identifies possible adversaries before the un-
derlying model (Pruthi et al., 2019; Sakaguchi et al., 2017).
Formal verification for neural networks In the field of
verification for NLP tasks, Shi et al. (2020) combined for-
ward propagation and a tighter backward bounding process
to achieve the formal verification of Transformers. Welbl
et al. (2020) proposed the formal verification under text dele-
tion for models based on the popular decomposable attention
mechanism by interval bound propagation. POPQORN (Ko
et al., 2019) is a general algorithm to quantify the robust-
ness of recurrent neural networks, including RNNs, LSTMs,
and GRUs. COLT (Balunovic & Vechev, 2020) combines
formal verification and adversarial training to train neural
networks. In this paper, we mix verification techniques,
namely, interval propagation, with search-based techniques.
3. The Perturbation-Robustness Problem
In this section, we (1) formalize the perturbation-robustness
problem and (2) define a string transformation language for
specifying the perturbation space.
3.1. Perturbation Robustness
Classification setting We consider a standard classification
setting with samples from some domain X and labels from
Y . Given a distribution D over samples and labels, our goal
is to find the optimal parameters θ of some neural-network
architecture Fθ that minimize the expected loss
argmin
θ
E
(x,y)∼D
L(x, y, θ) (1)
We are interested in the setting where the sample space X
defines strings over some finite alphabet Σ. The alphabet Σ
can be, for example, English characters (in a character-level
model) or entire words (in a world-level model). Therefore,
the domain X in our setting is Σ∗, i.e., the set of all strings
of elements of Σ. We will use x ∈ Σ∗ to denote a string
and xi ∈ Σ to denote the ith element of the string.
Perturbation space We define a perturbation space R as a
function in Σ∗ → 2Σ∗ , i.e., R takes a string x and returns a
finite set of possible perturbed strings of x.
We will use a perturbation space to denote a set of strings
that should receive the same classification by our network.
For example, R(x) could define a set of sentences para-
phrasing x. We can thus modify our training objective into a
robust-optimization problem, following Madry et al. (2018):
argmin
θ
E
(x,y)∼D
max
z∈R(x)
L(z, y, θ) (2)
This inner objective is usually hard to solve; in our setting,
the perturbation space can be very large and we cannot
afford to consider every single point in that space during
training. Therefore, as we discussed in Section 1, typically
approximations are made.
Exhaustive accuracy Once we have trained a model Fθ
using the robust optimization objective, we will use ex-
haustive accuracy to quantify its classification accuracy
in the face of perturbations. Specifically, given a dataset
D = {(xi, yi)}ni=1 and a perturbation space R, we define
exhaustive accuracy as follows:
1
n
n∑
i=1
1[∀ z ∈ R(xi). Fθ(z) = yi] (3)
Intuitively, for each sample (xi, yi), its classification is con-
sidered correct iff Fθ predicts yi for every single point in
R(xi). We use exhaustive accuracy instead of the com-
monly used adversarial accuracy because (1) exhaustive
accuracy provides the ground truth accuracy of the discrete
perturbation spaces and does not depend on an underlying
adversarial attack, and (2) the discrete spaces make it easy
for us to compute exhaustive accuracy by enumeration and
at the same time hard for the gradient-based adversarial
attacks to explore the space.
3.2. A Language for Specifying Perturbations
We have thus far assumed that the perturbation space is
provided to us. We now describe a language for modularly
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specifying a perturbation space.
A specification S is defined as follows:
S = {(T1, δ1), . . . , (Tn, δn)}
where each Ti denotes a string transformation that can be
applied up to δi ∈ N times. Formally, a string transforma-
tion T is a pair (ϕ, f), where ϕ : Σ∗ → {0, 1} is a Boolean
predicate (in practice, a regular expression) describing the
substrings of the inputs to which the transformation can be
applied, and f : Σ∗ → 2Σ∗ is a transformer describing how
the substrings matched by ϕ can be replaced.
Single transformations Before defining the semantics of
our specification language, we illustrate a few example spec-
ifications involving single transformations:
Example 1 (Tstop = (ϕstop, fstop)). Suppose we want to de-
fine a transformation that deletes a stop word—and, the,
is, etc.—mimicking a typo. The predicate ϕstop will be a
regular expression matching all stop words. The transformer
fstop will be simply the function that takes a string and re-
turns the set containing the empty string, fstop(x) = {}.
Consider a specification Sstop = {(Tstop, 1)} that applies
the transformation Tstop up to one time. On the following
string, They are at school, the predicate ϕstop matches the
substrings are and at. In both cases, we apply the predicate
fstop to the matched word and insert the output of fstop in
its position. This results in the set containing the original
string (0 transformations are applied) and the two strings
They at school and They are school. Applying a specifica-
tion S2stop = {(Tstop, 2)}, which is allowed to apply Tstop
at most twice, to the same input would result in a set of
strings containing the strings above as well as the string
They school.
Example 2 (Tnice = (ϕnice, fnice)). Say we want to trans-
form occurrences of nice into one of its synonyms, enjoyable
and pleasant. We define the predicate ϕnice(x) that is true iff
x = nice, and we define fnice(x) = {enjoyable, pleasant}.
Given the string This is nice!, it will be transformed into the
set {This is enjoyable!, This is pleasant!}.
Applying a specification S2nice = {(Tnice, 2)} to the same
input would result in the same set of strings above. Because
the predicate ϕnice(x) only matches the word nice.
Example 3 (Tswap = (ϕswap, fswap)). Now consider the case
where we would like to swap adjacent vowels. ϕswap will
be defined as the regular expression that matches two adja-
cent characters that are vowels. Next, since x = x0x1 can
only have length 2, the transformer fswap will be the swap
function fswap(x0x1) = {x1x0}.
Multiple transformations As discussed above, a spec-
ification S in our language is a set of transformations
{(T1, δ1), . . . , (Tn, δn)} where each Ti is a pair (ϕi, fi).
The formal semantics of our language can be found in the
supplementary Appendix. Informally, a string z is in the
perturbation space S(x) if it can be obtained by (1) finding
a set σ of non-overlapping substrings of x that match the
various predicates ϕi and such that at most δi substrings in
σ are matches of ϕi, and (2) replacing each substring x′ ∈ σ
matched by ϕi with a string in fi(x′). The complexity of
the formalization is due to the requirement that matched
substrings should not overlap—this requirement guarantees
that each character in the input is only involved in a sin-
gle transformation and will be useful when formalizing our
abstract training approach in Section 4.2.
Example 4 (Multiple Transformations). Using the transfor-
mations Tnice and Tswap we can define the specification
Sns = {(Tnice, 1), (Tswap, 1)}
Then, Sns(This house is nice) results in the set of strings:
This house is nice This house is enjoyable
This house is pleasant This huose is nice
This huose is enjoyable This huose is pleasant
The transformed portions are shown in bold. Note that we
apply up to 1 of each transformation, thus we also get the
original string. Also, note that the two transformations can-
not modify overlapping substrings of the input; for example,
Tswap did not swap the ea in pleasant.
4. Augmented Abstract Adversarial Training
In this section, we describe our abstract training technique,
A3T, which combines augmentation and abstraction.
Recall the adversarial training objective function, Eq. (2).
The difficulty in solving this objective is the inner maxi-
mization objective: maxz∈R(x) L(z, y, θ), where the per-
turbation space R(x) can be intractably large to efficiently
enumerate, and we therefore have to resort to approximation.
We begin by describing two approximation techniques and
then discuss how our approach combines and extends them.
Augmentation (search-based) techniques We call the first
class of techniques augmentation techniques, since they
search for a worst-case sample in the perturbation space
R(x) with which to augment the dataset. The naı¨ve way is
to simply enumerate all points in R(x)—our specifications
induce a finite perturbation space, by construction. Unfor-
tunately, this can drastically slow down the training. For
example, suppose T defines a transformation that swaps two
adjacent characters. On a string of length N , the specifica-
tion (T, 2) results in O(N2) transformations.
An efficient alternative, HotFlip, was proposed by Ebrahimi
et al. (2018). HotFlip efficiently encodes a transformation T
as an operation over the embedding vector and approximates
the worst-case loss using a single forward and backward
pass through the network. To search through a set of trans-
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Algorithm 1 A3T
Input: S = {(T1, δ1), . . . , (Tn, δn)} and point (x, y)
Output: worst-case loss
Split S into Saug and Sabs and return
max
z∈augmentk(Saug,x)
L(ẑ, y, θ) s.t. ẑ = abstract(Sabs, z)
formations, HotFlip employs a beam search of some size k
to get the top-k perturbed samples. This technique yields a
point in R(x) that may not have the worst-case loss. Alter-
natives like MHA (Zhang et al., 2019a) can also be used as
augmentation techniques.
Abstraction techniques Abstraction techniques compute
an over-approximation of the perturbation space, as a sym-
bolic set of constraints. This set of constraints is then propa-
gated through the network, resulting in an upper bound on
the worst-case loss. Specifically, given a transformation T ,
we define a corresponding abstract transformation T̂ such
that for all x, the constraint T (x) ⊆ T̂ (x) holds.
Our use of abstraction builds upon the work of Huang et al.
(2019), which uses an interval domain to define T̂ (x) —
i.e., T̂ (x) is a conjunction of constraints on each character.
We will describe how we generalize their approach in Sec-
tion 4.2; for now, we assume that we can efficiently over-
approximate the worst-case loss for T̂ (x) by propagating it
through the network.
4.1. A3T: A High-Level View
The key idea of A3T is to decompose a specification S into
two sets of transformations, one containing transformations
that can be effectively explored with augmentation and one
containing transformations that can be precisely abstracted.
Algorithm 1 shows how A3T works. First, we decompose
the specification S into two subsets of transformations, re-
sulting in two specifications, Saug and Sabs. For Saug, we
apply an augmentation technique, e.g., HotFlip or MHA, to
come up with a list of top-k perturbed samples in the set
Saug(x)—this is denoted as the set augmentk(Saug,x).
Then, for each point z in the top-k results, we compute an
abstraction abstract(Sabs, z), which is a set of constraints
over-approximating the set of points in Sabs(z). Recall our
overview in Fig. 1 for a visual depiction of this process.
Finally, we return the worst-case loss.
4.2. Computing Abstractions
We now show how to define the abstraction of a perturba-
tion space S(x) defined by a specification S = {(T1, δ1),
. . . , (Tn, δn)}. Our approach generalizes that of Huang
ab
ag
zb
zg
x1
x2
cd
dc
bc
cb db
bd
cc x1
x2
Figure 2. Illustration of an abstraction of a single (left) and multiple
(right) transformations. See Example 5 and Example 6 for details.
et al. (2019) to length-preserving transformations, i.e., ones
where the length of every string in S(x) is the same as the
length of the original string x. The approach of Huang
et al. (2019) targeted the special case of single-character
substitutions.
Single transformation case We first demonstrate the case
of a single length-preserving transformation, S = {(T, δ)}.
Henceforth we assume that each element of a string x is
a real value, e.g., the embedding of a character or word.
At a high level, our abstraction computes the convex hull
that contains all the points in T (x) (we use T (x) as a short
hand for the perturbation space obtained by applying T to
x exactly once) and then scales this convex hull by δ to
account for the cases in which T is applied up to δ times.
We begin by computing all points in T (x). Let this set be
x0, . . . ,xm. Next, for i ∈ [1,m], we define the set of points
vi = x+δ · (xi−x).
We then construct the abstraction abstract(Sabs, z) as the
convex hull of the points vi and x. Observe that we only
need to enumerate the space T (x) obtained by applying T
once; multiplying by δ dilates the convex hull to include all
strings that involve up to δ applications of T , i.e., S(x). To
propagate this convex hull through the network, we typically
overapproximate it as a set of interval constraints, where
each dimension of a string is represented by a lower and
an upper bound. Interval constraints are easier to propa-
gate through the network—requiring several forward passes
linear in the length of the string—compared to arbitrary
convex polyhedra, whose operations can be exponential in
the number of dimensions (Cousot & Halbwachs, 1978).
Example 5. Consider the left side of Fig. 2. Say we have the
string ab and the transformation T that can replace character
awith z, or bwith g—mimicking spelling mistakes, as these
characters are adjacent on a QWERTY keyboard. The large
shaded region is the result of dilating T with δ = 2, i.e.,
contains all strings that can be produced by applying T
twice to the string ab, namely, the string zg.
General case We generalize the above abstraction process
to the perturbation space S = {(T1, δ1), . . . , (Tn, δn)}.
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First, we enumerate all the strings in T1(x) ∪ · · · ∪ Tn(x).
(Notice that we need only consider each transformation
Ti independently.) Let this set be x0, . . . ,xm. Next, for
i ∈ [1,m], we define the following set of points:
vi = x+(δ1 + . . .+ δn) · (xi−x)
As with the single-transformation case, we can now con-
struct an abstraction of the convex hull induced by vi and x
as a set of intervals and propagate it through the network.
Example 6. We illustrate the process of abstracting an in-
put string cc on the right of Figure 2 for the specification
{(Tprev, 1), (Tsucc, 1)}, where Tprev maps one character to
its preceding character in the alphabet order, e.g., c with
b, and Tsucc maps one character to its succeeding character
in the alphabet order, e.g., c with d. We enumerate all the
points in Tprev(cc)∪Tsucc(cc) and compute their convex hull,
shown as the inner shaded region. This region includes all
strings resulting from exclusively one application of Tprev
or Tsucc. Next, we dilate the convex hull by 2 = 1 + 1
times to include all the points in the perturbation space of
{(Tprev, 1), (Tsucc, 1)}. This is shown as the larger shaded
region. Notice how this region includes bd and db, which
result from an application of Tsucc to the first character and
Tprev to the second character of the original string cc.
The following theorem states that this process is sound: pro-
duces an overapproximation of a perturbation space S(x).
Theorem 1. For every specification S and input x, the
abstracted perturbation space abstract(S,x) is an over-
approximation of S(x)—i.e., S(x) ⊆ abstract(S,x)
We prove Theorem 1 in the Appendix.
5. Experiments
In this section, we evaluate A3T by answering the following
research questions:
• RQ1: Does A3T improve robustness in rich perturba-
tion spaces for character-level and word-level models?
• RQ2: How does the complexity of the perturbation
space affect the effectiveness of A3T?
5.1. Experimental Setup
5.1.1. DATASETS AND MODELS
We use two datasets:
• AG News (Zhang et al., 2015) dataset consists of a
corpus of news articles collected by Gulli (2005) about
the 4 largest news topics. We used the online available
dataset from Github2. The dataset contains 30,000
training and 1,900 testing examples for each class. We
split the first 4,000 training examples for validation
purpose.
• SST2 (Socher et al., 2013) is the Stanford Sentiment
Treebank dataset that consists of sentences from movie
reviews and human annotations of their sentiment. The
task is to predict the sentiment (positive/negative) of
a given sentence. We used the dataset provided by
TensorFlow3. The dataset contains 67,349 training,
872 validation, and 1,821 testing examples for each
class.
For the AG dataset, we trained a smaller character-level
model than the one used in Huang et al. (2019), but kept
the number of layers and the data preprocessing the same.
For the SST2 dataset, we trained a word-level model and a
character-level model. We used the same models in Huang
et al. (2019) also following their setup. The details of
setups are shown in the Appendix.
5.1.2. PERTURBATIONS
Our choice of models allows us to experiment on both
character-level and word-level perturbations. We evaluated
A3T on six perturbation spaces constructed using the seven
individual string transformations in Table 1.
For the character-level model on dataset AG, we used
the following specifications: {(TSwapPair, 2), (TSubAdj, 2)},
{(TDel, 2), (TSubAdj, 2)}, and {(TInsAdj, 2), (TSubAdj, 2)}. For
example, the first specification mimics the combination of
two spelling mistakes: swap two characters up to twice
and/or substitute a character with an adjacent one on the
keyboard up to twice.
For the word-level model on dataset SST2, we used
the following specifications: {(TDelStop, 2), (TSubSyn, 2)},
{(TDelStop, 2), (TDup, 2)}, and {(TDelStop, 2), (TDup, 2),
(TSubSyn, 2)}. The first specification, for example, removes
stop words up to twice and substitutes up to twice words
with synonyms.
For the character-level model on dataset SST2, we used
the following specifications: {(TSwapPair, 1), (TSubAdj, 1)},
{(TDel, 1), (TSubAdj, 1)}, and {(TInsAdj, 1), (TSubAdj, 1)}. For
example, the first specification mimics the combination of
two spelling mistakes: swap two characters and/or substitute
a character with an adjacent one on the keyboard.
For the character-level model on AG dataset, we con-
2This is the website describing the dataset: https:
//github.com/mhjabreel/CharCnn_Keras/tree/
master/data/ag_news_csv.
3This is the website describing the dataset: https://www.
tensorflow.org/datasets/catalog/glue.
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Table 1. String transformations to construct the perturbation spaces for evaluation.
Transformation Description Training
C
H
A
R
TSwapPair swap a pair of two adjacent characters Augmentation
TDel delete a character Augmentation
TInsAdj insert to the right of a character one of its adjacent characters on the keyboard Augmentation
TSubAdj substitute a character with an adjacent character on the keyboard Abstraction
W
O
R
D TDelStop delete a stop word Augmentation
TDup duplicate a word Augmentation
TSubSyn substitute a word with one of its synonyms Abstraction
Table 2. Qualitative examples. The vanilla models correctly classify the original samples but fail to classify the perturbed samples.
Prediction A character-level sample and a perturbed sample in {(TSwapPair, 2), (TSubAdj, 2)} of AG dataset
Sci/Tech ky. company wins grant to study peptides (ap) ap - a company founded by a chemistry researcher ...
World yk. compnay wins granf to st8dy peptides (ap) ap - a company founded by a chemistry researcher ...
Prediction A word-level sample and a perturbed sample in {(TDelStop, 2), (TSubSyn, 2)} of SST2 dataset
Positive a dream cast of solid female talent who build a seamless ensemble .
Negative a dreaming casting of solid female talent who build a seamless ensemble .
sidered the perturbations to be applied to a prefix of
an input string, namely, a prefix length of 35 for
{(TSwapPair, 2), (TSubAdj, 2)}, a prefix length of 30 for
{(TDel, 2), (TSubAdj, 2)}, and {(TInsAdj, 2), (TSubAdj, 2)}. For
the character-level model on SST2 dataset, we considered
perturbations with δ = 1 but allow the perturbations to be
applied to the whole input string. We made these restric-
tions because one cannot efficiently evaluate the exhaustive
accuracy with larger δ, due to the combinatorial explosion
of the size of the perturbation space.
5.1.3. TRAINING METHODS
We implement and compare the following training methods.
Normal training is the vanilla training method (Eq. (1))
that minimizes the cross entropy between predictions and
target labels. This method does not use the perturbation
space and does not attempt to train a robust model.
Random augmentation performs adversarial training
(Eq. (2)) using a weak adversary that simply picks a random
perturbed sample from the perturbation space.
HotFlip augmentation performs adversarial training
(Eq. (2)) using the HotFlip (Ebrahimi et al., 2018) attack to
solve the inner maximization problem.
A3T is our technique that can be implemented in various
ways. For our experiments, we made the following choices.
First, we manually labeled which transformations in S are
explored using augmentation and which ones are explored
using abstract interpretation (the third column in Table 1).4
Second, we implemented two different ways of perform-
ing data augmentation for the transformations in Saug: (1)
A3T(HotFlip) uses HotFlip to find the worst-case sam-
ples for augmentation, while (2) A3T(search) performs
an explicit search through the perturbation space to find
the worst-case samples for augmentation. Finally, we used
DiffAI (Mirman et al., 2018) to perform abstract training for
the transformations in Sabs, using the intervals abstraction.
In all augmentation training baselines, and A3T, we also
adopt a curriculum-based training method (Huang et al.,
2019; Gowal et al., 2019) which uses a hyperparameter λ to
weigh between normal loss and maximization objective in
Eq. (2).
5.1.4. EVALUATION METRICS
Normal accuracy is the vanilla accuracy of the model on
the test set.
HotFlip accuracy is the adversarial accuracy of the model
with respect to the HotFlip attack, i.e., for each point in
the test set, we apply the HotFlip attack and test if the
classification is still correct.
Exhaustive accuracy (Eq 3) is the worst-case accuracy of
the model: a prediction on (x, y) is considered correct if and
4We consider this choice of split to be a hyperparameter.
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Table 3. Experiment results for the three perturbations on the character-level model on AG dataset. We show the normal accuracy (Acc.),
HotFlip accuracy (HF Acc.), and exhaustive accuracy (Exhaustive) of five different training methods.
{(TSwapPair, 2), (TSubAdj, 2)} {(TDel, 2), (TSubAdj, 2)} {(TInsAdj, 2), (TSubAdj, 2)}
Training Acc. HF Acc. Exhaustive Acc. HF Acc. Exhaustive Acc. HF Acc. Exhaustive
Normal 87.5 71.5 60.1 87.5 79.0 62.5 87.5 79.1 59.0
Random Aug. 87.5 75.7 68.2 [+8.1] 87.4 81.3 69.4 [+6.9] 87.8 81.2 69.7 [+10.7]
HotFlip Aug. 86.6 85.7 84.9 [+24.8] 85.8 84.9 82.7 [+20.2] 86.8 85.9 82.6 [+23.6]
A3T(HotFlip) 86.4 86.4 86.4 [+26.3] 87.2 87.1 85.7 [+23.2] 87.4 87.4 85.5 [+26.5]
A3T(search) 86.9 86.8 86.8 [+26.7] 87.6 87.4 86.2 [+23.7] 87.9 87.8 86.5 [+27.5]
Table 4. Experiment results for the three perturbations on the word-level model on SST dataset.
{TDelStop, 2), (TSubSyn, 2)} {(TDelStop, 2), (TDup, 2)} {(TDelStop, 2), (TDup, 2), (TSubSyn, 2)}
Training Acc. HF Acc. Exhaustive Acc. HF Acc. Exhaustive Acc. HF Acc. Exhaustive
Normal 82.4 68.9 64.4 82.4 55.8 47.9 82.4 54.8 42.4
Random Aug. 80.0 70.0 66.0 [+1.6] 81.5 54.2 49.7 [+1.8] 81.0 56.1 46.2 [+3.8]
HotFlip Aug. 80.8 74.4 68.3 [+3.9] 80.8 68.7 56.0 [+8.1] 81.2 69.0 51.0 [+8.6]
A3T(HotFlip) 80.2 73.5 70.2 [+5.8] 79.9 69.7 57.7 [+9.8] 78.8 68.1 55.1 [+12.7]
A3T(search) 79.9 74.4 71.2 [+6.8] 79.0 70.7 62.7 [+14.8] 77.7 69.8 59.8 [+17.4]
only if all points z ∈ S(x) lead to the correct prediction.
By definition, HotFlip accuracy is an upper bound on ex-
haustive accuracy.
5.2. Evaluation Results
RQ1: Increase in robustness We show the results for the
selected perturbation spaces on character-level and word-
level models in Tables 3, 4, and 5, respectively.
Compared to normal training, the results show that both
A3T(HotFlip) and A3T(search) increase the exhaustive
accuracy and can improve the robustness of the model.
A3T(HotFlip) and A3T(search) also outperform random
augmentation and HotFlip augmentation. In particular,
A3T(search) has exhaustive accuracy that is on average
20.3 higher than normal training, 14.6 higher than random
augmentation, and 6.7 higher than HotFlip augmentation.
We also compared A3T to training using only abstrac-
tion (i.e., all transformations in S are also in Sabs) for the
specification {(TSwapPair, 2), (TSubAdj, 2)} on AG dataset and
{(TSwapPair, 1), (TSubAdj, 1)} on SST2 dataset (not shown in
Tables 3, 4, and 5); this is the only specification that can be
fully trained abstractly since it only uses length-preserving
transformations. Training using only abstraction yields an
exhaustive accuracy of 86.9 for {(TSwapPair, 2), (TSubAdj, 2)}
on AG dataset, which is similar to the exhaustive accu-
racy of A3T(HotFlip) (86.4) and A3T(search) (86.8). How-
ever, training using only abstraction yields an exhaustive
accuracy of 47.0 for {(TSwapPair, 1), (TSubAdj, 1)} on SST2
dataset, which is better than the one obtained using normal
training, but much lower than the exhaustive accuracy of
A3T(HotFlip) and A3T(search). Furthermore, the normal
accuracy of the abstraction technique on SST2 dataset drops
to 58.8 due to the over-approximation of the perturbation
space, while A3T(HotFlip) (73.6) and A3T(search) (70.2)
retain high normal accuracy.
To answer RQ1, A3T yields models that are more robust
to complex perturbation spaces than those produced by
augmentation and abstraction techniques. This result
holds for both character-level and word-level models.
RQ2: Effects of size of the perturbation space In
this section, we evaluate whether A3T can produce
models that are robust to complex perturbation spaces.
We fix the word-level model A3T (search) trained on
{(TDelStop, 2), (TSubSyn, 2)}. Then, we test this model’s
exhaustive accuracy on {(TDelStop, δ1), (TSubSyn, 2)} (Fig-
ure 3(a)) and {(TDelStop, 2), (TSubSyn, δ2)} (Figure 3(b)),
where we vary the parameters δ1 and δ2 between 1 and 4, in-
creasing the size of the perturbation space. (The Appendix
contains a more detailed evaluation with different types
of transformations.) We only consider word-level models
because computing the exhaustive accuracy requires us to
enumerate all the elements in the perturbation space. While
enumeration is feasible for word-level transformations
(e.g., the perturbation space of {(TDelStop, 4), (TSubSyn, 2)}
for a string with 56 tokens contains at most 68,002 per-
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Table 5. Experiment results for the three perturbations on the character-level model on SST2 dataset.
{(TSwapPair, 1), (TSubAdj, 1)} {(TDel, 1), (TSubAdj, 1)} {(TInsAdj, 1), (TSubAdj, 1)}
Training Acc. HF Acc. Exhaustive Acc. HF Acc. Exhaustive Acc. HF Acc. Exhaustive
Normal 77.0 36.5 23.0 77.0 50.7 25.8 77.0 51.0 24.4
Random Aug. 75.6 47.1 28.2 [+5.2] 75.7 56.4 29.3 [+3.5] 74.5 57.0 33.8 [+9.4]
HotFlip Aug. 71.4 63.9 34.8 [+11.8] 76.6 67.1 38.0 [+12.2] 76.1 70.4 33.4 [+9.0]
A3T(HotFlip) 73.6 54.8 35.2 [+12.2] 75.3 58.2 32.9 [+7.1] 72.4 66.3 44.7 [+20.3]
A3T(search) 70.2 57.1 48.7 [+15.7] 72.5 62.5 44.8 [+19.0] 71.6 65.0 55.2 [+30.8]
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Figure 3. The exhaustive accuracy of {(TDelStop, δ1), (TSubSyn, δ2)}, varying the parameters δ1 (left) and δ2 (right) between 1 and 4.
turbed samples), enumeration is infeasible for charac-
ter level transformations (e.g., the perturbation space of
{(TDel, 4), (TSubAdj, 2)} for a string with 300 characters con-
tains 7,499,469 perturbed samples, and the perturbation
space of {(TDel, 4), (TSubAdj, 1)} for a string with 300 char-
acters contains 20,252,321,116 perturbed samples!).
The exhaustive accuracy of A3T(HotFlip) and A3T(search)
decreases by 1.6% and 1.1%, respectively, when increas-
ing δ1 from 1 to 4, and decreases by 2.1% and 1.4%, re-
spectively, when increasing δ2 from 1 to 4. All other
techniques result in larger decreases in exhaustive accu-
racy (≥1.7% in {(TDelStop, δ1), (TSubSyn, 2)} and ≥4.2% in
{(TDelStop, 2), (TSubSyn, δ2)}).
To answer RQ2, even in the presence of large perturba-
tion spaces A3T yields models that are more robust than
those produced by augmentation techniques.
6. Conclusion, Limitations, and Future Work
We presented an adversarial training technique, A3T,
that combines augmentation and abstraction techniques to
achieve robustness against programmable string transforma-
tions in neural networks for NLP tasks. In the experiments,
we showed that A3T yields more robust models than aug-
mentation and abstraction techniques.
We foresee many future improvements to A3T. First, A3T
cannot currently generalize to RNNs because its abstraction
technique can only be applied to models where the first
layer is an affine transformation (e.g. linear or convolutional
layer). Applying A3T to RNNs will require designing new
abstraction techniques for RNNs. Second, we manually
split S into Saug and Sabs. Performing the split automati-
cally is left as future work. Third, A3T(search) achieves the
best performance by looking for the worst-case perturbed
sample in the perturbation space of Saug via enumeration.
In some practical settings, Saug might induce a large pertur-
bation space and it might best to use A3T(HotFlip) instead.
Fourth, we choose HotFlip and interval abstraction to ap-
proximate the worst-case loss in our experiments, but our
approach is general and can benefit from new augmentation
and abstraction techniques.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Semantics of specifications
We define the semantics of a specification S =
{(T1, δ1), . . . , (Tn, δn)} (such that Ti = (ϕi, fi)) as fol-
lows. Given a string x = x1 . . . xm, a string y is in the
perturbations space S(x) if:
1. there exists matches 〈(l1, r1), j1〉 . . . 〈(lk, rk), jk〉 (we
assume that matches are sorted in ascending order of
li) such that for every i 6 k we have that (li, ri) is a
valid match of ϕji in x;
2. the matches are not overlapping: for every two distinct
i1 and i2, ri1 < li2 or ri2 < li1 ;
3. the matches respect the δ constraints: for every j′ 6 n,
|{〈(li, ri), ji〉 | ji = j′}| 6 δj′ .
4. the string y is the result of applying an appropriate
transformation to each match: if for every i 6 k we
have si ∈ fji(xli . . . xri), then
y = x1 . . . xl1−1 s1 xr1+1 . . . xlk−1 sk xrk+1 . . . xm.
A.2. Proof of Theorem 1
We give the following definition of a convex set:
Definition 1. Convex set: A set C is convex if, for all x
and y in C, the line segment connecting x and y is included
in C.
Proof. We first state and prove the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Given a set of points {p0, p1, . . . , pt} and a
convex set C such that {p0, p1, . . . , pt} ⊂ C. These points
define a set of vectors −−→p0p1,−−→p0p2, . . . ,−−→p0pt. If a vector −→p0p
can be represented as a sum weighed by αi:
−→p0p =
t∑
i=1
αi · −−→p0pi, (4)
where αi respect to constraints:
t∑
i=1
αi ≤ 1 ∧ ∀1 ≤ i ≤ t. αi ≥ 0, (5)
then the point p is also in the convex set C.
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction on t,
• Base case: t = 1, if −→p0p = α1 · −−→p0p1 and 0 ≤ α1 ≤ 1,
then p is on the segment p0p1. By the definition of the
convex set (Definition 1), the segment p0p1 is inside
the convex, which implies p is inside the convex: p ∈
p0p1 ⊆ C.
• Inductive step: Suppose the lemma holds for t = r. If
a vector −→p0p can be represented as a sum weighed by
αi:
−→p0p =
r+1∑
i=1
αi · −−→p0pi (6)
where αi respect to constraints:
r+1∑
i=1
αi ≤ 1, (7)
∀1 ≤ i ≤ r + 1. αi ≥ 0. (8)
We divide the sum in Eq 6 into two parts:
−→p0p =
r+1∑
i=1
αi · −−→p0pi (9)
= (
r∑
i=1
αi · −−→p0pi) + αr+1 · −−−−→p0pr+1 (10)
= (1− αr+1)
−−→
p0p
′ + αr+1 · −−−−→p0pr+1 , and
(11)
−−→
p0p
′ =
r∑
i=1
αi
1− αr+1 ·
−−→p0pi (12)
Because from Inequality 7, we know that
r∑
i=1
αi ≤ 1− αr+1,
which is equivalent to
r∑
i=1
αi
1− αr+1 ≤ 1.
This inequality enables the inductive hypothesis, and
we know point p′ is in the convex set C. From Eq 11,
we know that the point p is on the segment of p′pr+1,
since both two points p′ and pr+1 are in the convex set
C, then the point p is also inside the convex set C.
To prove Theorem 1, we need to show that every per-
turbed sample y ∈ S(x) lies inside the convex hull of
abstract(S,x).
We first describe the perturbed sample y. The perturbed
sample y as a string is defined in the semantics of specifi-
cation S (see the Appendix A.1). In the rest of this proof,
we use a function E : Σm 7→ Rm×d mapping from a string
with length m to a point in m× d-dimensional space, e.g.,
E(y) represents the point of the perturbed sample y in the
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embedding space. We use x〈(l,r),j,s〉 to represent the string
perturbed by a transformation Tj = (ϕj , fj) such that (l, r)
is a valid match of ϕj and s ∈ fj(xl, . . . , xr). Then
x〈(l,r),j,s〉 = x1 . . . xl−1 sxr+1 . . . xm.
We further define ∆〈(l,r),j,s〉 as the vector E(x〈(l,r),j,s〉)−
E(x) =
−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
E(x)E(x〈(l,r),j,s〉):
∆〈(l,r),j,s〉 = (0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
(l−1)×d
, E(s)− E(xl . . . xr), 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
(m−r)×d
).
A perturbed sample y defined by matches
〈(l1, r1), j1〉 . . . 〈(lk, rk), jk〉 and for every i 6 k we
have si ∈ fji(xli . . . xri), then
y = x1 . . . xl1−1 s1 xr1+1 . . . xlk−1 sk xrk+1 . . . xm.
The matches respect the δ constraints: for every j′ ≤ n,
|{〈(li, ri), ji, si〉 | ji = j′}| 6 δj′ . Thus, the size of the
matches k also respect the δ constraints:
k =
n∑
j′=1
|{〈(li, ri), ji, si〉 | ji = j′}| ≤
n∑
j′=1
δj′ . (13)
In the embedding space,
−−−−−−−→
E(x)E(y) = (0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
(l1−1)×d
, E(s1)− E(xl1 . . . xr1),
0, . . . , 0, E(sk)− E(xlk . . . xrk), 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
(m−rk)×d
).
Thus, we can represent
−−−−−−−→
E(x)E(y) using ∆〈(l,r),j,s〉:
−−−−−−−→
E(x)E(y) =
k∑
i=1
∆〈(li,ri),ji,si〉. (14)
We then describe the convex hull of abstract(S,x). The
convex hull of abstract(S,x) is constructed by a set of
points E(x) and E(v〈(l,r),i,s〉), where points E(v〈(l,r),i,s〉)
are computed by:
E(v〈(l,r),j,s〉) , E(x) + (
n∑
i=1
δi)(E(x〈(l,r),j,s〉)− E(x)).
Alternatively, using the definition of ∆〈(l,r),j,s〉, we get
−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
E(x)E(v〈(l,r),j,s〉) = (
n∑
i=1
δi)∆〈(l,r),j,s〉. (15)
We then prove the Theorem 1. To prove E(y) lies in the
convex hull of abstract(S,x), we need to apply Lemma 2.
Notice that a convex hull by definition is also a convex set.
Because from Eq 14, we have
−−−−−−−→
E(x)E(y) =
k∑
i=1
∆〈(li,ri),ji,si〉
=
1∑n
i=1 δi
k∑
i=1
(
n∑
i′=1
δi′)∆〈(li,ri),ji,si〉.
We can use Eq 15 into the above equation, and have
=
1∑n
i=1 δi
k∑
i=1
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
E(x)E(v〈(li,ri),ji,si〉)
=
k∑
i=1
(
1∑n
i=1 δi
) · −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→E(x)E(v〈(li,ri),ji,si〉).
To apply Lemma 2, we set
αi =
1∑n
j=1 δj
.
Using Inequality 13 on
αi =
1∑n
j=1 δj
≥ 0, (16)
we get
k∑
i=1
αi =
k∑
i=1
1∑n
j=1 δj
=
k∑n
j=1 δj
≤ 1. (17)
The constraints in Inequality 16 and Inequality 17 enable
Lemma 2, and by applying Lemma 2, we know that point
E(y) is inside the convex hull of abstract(S,x).
A.3. Details of Experiment Setup
For AG dataset, we trained a smaller character-level model
than the one used in Huang et al. (2019). We followed
the setup of the previous work: use lower-case letters only
and truncate the inputs to have at most 300 characters. The
model consists of an embedding layer of dimension 64, a
1-D convolution layer with 64 kernels of size 10, a ReLU
layer, a 1-D average pooling layer of size 10, and two fully-
connected layers with ReLUs of size 64, and a linear layer.
We randomly initialized the character embedding and up-
dated it during training.
For SST2 dataset, we trained the same word-level model as
the one used in Huang et al. (2019). The model consists of
an embedding layer of dimension 300, a 1-D convolution
layer with 100 kernels of size 5, a ReLU layer, a 1-D average
pooling layer of size 5, and a linear layer. We used the pre-
trained Glove embedding (Pennington et al., 2014) with
dimension 300 and fixed it during training.
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For SST2 dataset, we trained the same character-level model
as the one used in Huang et al. (2019). The model consists
of an embedding layer of dimension 150, a 1-D convolution
layer with 100 kernels of size 5, a ReLU layer, a 1-D average
pooling layer of size 5, and a linear layer. We randomly
initialized the character embedding and updated it during
training.
For all models, we used Adam (Kingma & Ba, 2015) with
a learning rate of 0.001 for optimization and applied early
stopping policy with patience 5.
A.3.1. PERTURBATIONS
We provide the details of the string transformations we used:
• TSubAdj, TInsAdj: We allow each character substituting
to one of its adjacent characters on the QWERTY key-
board.
• TDelStop: We choose {and, the, a, to, of} as our stop
words set.
• TSubSyn: We use the synonyms provided by
PPDB (Pavlick et al., 2015). We allow each word
substituting to its closest synonym when their part-of-
speech tags are also matched.
A.3.2. BASELINE
Random augmentation performs adversarial training us-
ing a weak adversary that simply picks a random perturbed
sample from the perturbation space. For a specification
S = {(T1, δ1), . . . , (Tn, δn)}, we produce z by uniformly
sampling one string z1 from a string transformation (T1, δ1)
and passing it to the next transformation (T2, δ2), where
we then sample a new string z2, and so on until we have
exhausted all transformations. The objective function is the
following:
argmin
θ
E
(x,y)∼D
(L(x, y, θ) + max
z∈R(x)
L(z, y, θ)) (18)
HotFlip augmentation performs adversarial training using
the HotFlip (Ebrahimi et al., 2018) attack to find z and solve
the inner maximization problem. The objective function is
the same as Eq 18.
A3T adopts a curriculum-based training method (Huang
et al., 2019; Gowal et al., 2019) that uses a hyperparameter
λ to weigh between normal loss and maximization objective
in Eq. (2). We linearly increase the hyperparameter λ during
training.
argmin
θ
E
(x,y)∼D
((1− λ)L(x, y, θ)+
λ max
z∈augmentk(Saug,x)
L(abstract(Sabsz), y, θ)).
Also, we set k in augmentk to 2, which means we select 2
perturbed samples to abstract.
A.3.3. EVALUATION RESULTS
RQ2: Effects of size of the perturbation space In Fig-
ure 4, we fix the word-level model A3T (search) trained
on {(TDup, 2), (TSubSyn, 2)}. Then, we test this model’s ex-
haustive accuracy on {(TDup, δ1), (TSubSyn, 2)} (Figure 4(a))
and {(TDup, 2), (TSubSyn, δ2)} (Figure 4(b)), where we vary
the parameters δ1 and δ2 between 1 and 4, increasing the
size of the perturbation space. The exhaustive accuracy of
A3T(HotFlip) and A3T(search) decreases by 17.4% and
11.4%, respectively, when increasing δ1 from 1 to 4, and de-
creases by 2.3% and 1.9%, respectively, when increasing δ2
from 1 to 4. All other techniques result in larger decreases in
exhaustive accuracy (≥17.5% in {(TDup, δ1), (TSubSyn, 2)}
and ≥3.1% in {(TDup, 2), (TSubSyn, δ2)}).
In Figure 5, we fix the word-level model A3T
(search) trained on {(TDelStop, 2), (TDup, 2), (TSubSyn, 2)}.
Then, we test this model’s exhaustive accuracy on
{(TDelStop, δ1), (TDup, 2), (TSubSyn, 2)} (Figure 5(a)),
{(TDelStop, 2), (TDup, δ2), (TSubSyn, 2)} (Figure 5(b)), and
{(TDelStop, 2), (TDup, 2), (TSubSyn, δ3)} (Figure 5(c)), where
we vary the parameters δ1, δ2 and δ3 between 1 and 3,
increasing the size of the perturbation space. The exhaustive
accuracy of A3T(HotFlip) and A3T(search) decreases by
1.1% and 0.9%, respectively, when increasing δ1 from 1
to 3, decreases by 12.9% and 6.9%, respectively, when
increasing δ2 from 1 to 3, and decreases by 1.4% and 0.9%,
respectively, when increasing δ3 from 1 to 3. All other
techniques result in larger decreases in exhaustive accuracy
(≥2.2% in {(TDelStop, δ1), (TDup, 2), (TSubSyn, 2)}, ≥13.0%
in {(TDelStop, 2), (TDup, δ2), (TSubSyn, 2)}, and ≥2.8% in
{(TDelStop, 2), (TDup, 2), (TSubSyn, δ3)}).
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Figure 4. The exhaustive accuracy of {(TDup, δ1), (TSubSyn, δ2)}, varying the parameters δ1 (left) and δ2 (right) between 1 and 4.
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(a) {(TDelStop, δ1), (TDup, 2), (TSubSyn, 2)}
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Figure 5. The exhaustive accuracy of {(TDelStop, δ1), (TDup, δ2), (TSubSyn, δ3)}, varying the parameters δ1 (left), δ2 (middle), and δ3 (right)
between 1 and 3.
